Does Inflation Targeting Matter for Output Growth? Evidence from Industrial and Emerging Economies by Varella Mollick, Andre et al.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4791
Does Inflation Targeting Matter 
for Output Growth? 
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4791
This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting 
on industrial and emerging economies’ output growth 
over the “globalization years” of 1986-2004. Controlling 
for trade openness and two indicators of financial 
globalization, the authors find systematic positive and 
significant effects of inflation targeting on real output 
growth. In dynamic models, the findings show strong 
output persistence in industrial economies, in which 
partial and full inflation targeting regimes have a positive 
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long-run impact on growth. In emerging markets, only 
full inflation targeting policies have any output effect 
in the long-run. The results suggest that strict inflation 
targeting is needed to make the discipline effect of 
the disinflation process outweigh the output costs of 
promoting high interest rates to attract capital flows in a 
global world. These findings are robust to the treatment 
of endogenous globalization measures. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A significant amount of literature has recently studied the effects of inflation 
targeting (IT) on price stability in industrial and emerging economies.
1 While the 
conclusion might still be debatable, the partial consensus seems to suggest that IT has 
been effective on achieving price stability in emerging market economies but not in 
industrial economies. Nonetheless, according to its supporters, the potential benefits of IT 
are not limited to price stability.  For instance, once a low, stable inflation is achieved and 
credibility is enhanced, IT could lead to a reduction of the output losses associated with 
disinflation. According to this view, “a case can even be made that inflation targeting 
promotes real economic growth in addition to controlling inflation.” Mishkin (1999, p. 
597) 
A recent literature has explored whether “globalization” (broadly understood as 
the growing volumes of trade and financial flows) helps economic growth.
2 Bekaert et al. 
(2005) demonstrate that equity market liberalization (foreign investors are allowed to 
transact in domestic securities and vice versa) does increase economic growth. They find 
                                                 
1 Among the studies that empirically assess the effects of IT on price stability across industrial countries 
see, for instance, Johnston (2002), Newman and von Hagen (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005). For 
empirical assessments among emerging markets, refer to Fraga et al. (2004), Lin and Ye (2008) and 
Gonçalves and Salles (2008), among others. There are also studies that assess emerging and industrial 
economies together, such as: Vega and Winkerlried (2005) and those that examine both groups separately 
and jointly (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). 
2 See Mishkin (2008) for a survey and a positive view. A similar characterization of globalization has been 
put forward recently by Kose et al. (2008) on the rising trade and financial linkages. See also Wynne and 
Kersting (2007) for the impact of trade, financial or labor openness on inflation under a cross-section 
approach, as well as evidence on the response of inflation to output gap as becoming less responsive with 
globalization. Sachsida et al. (2003) document a negative relation between inflation and trade openness for 
152 countries over 1950-1992. Discussing the currency and financial crises in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
Kose et al. (2006, p. 7) mention that “there is a widely held perception that developing countries that 
opened up to capital flows have been more vulnerable to these crises than industrial economies, and have 
been much more adversely affected. These developments have sparked a fierce debate among academics 
and practitioners on the costs and benefits of financial globalization. This debate has intensified and 
become more polarized over time, in contrast to the debate on trade liberalization, which has more or less 
moved toward a consensus.”   3
that equity market liberalization leads to an approximate 1% increase in annual real per 
capita GDP growth. Alfaro et al. (2004) find that countries with well-developed financial 
markets gain significantly from FDI and Alfaro and Hammel (2008) identify that stock 
market liberalizations are associated with a significant increase in the share of machinery 
and equipment and, therefore, economic growth. This body of evidence suggests that any 
empirical work to explain GDP growth over time that overlooks financial or trade 
measures is fundamentally flawed.  
A major advance to study globalization has been the comprehensive dataset made 
available by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). They have constructed estimates of external 
assets and liabilities for 145 countries for 1970-2004 and have documented the increasing 
importance of equity financing and the improvement in the external position for emerging 
markets, as well as the differing pace of financial integration between advanced and 
developing economies. This dataset supersedes own measures of financial globalization 
built by researchers so far.
3 
Although there is no theoretical and empirical consensus about the overall impact 
of IT on output growth, it is well accepted that all IT central banks “not only aim at 
stabilizing inflation around the target but also put some weight on stabilizing the real 
economy” (Svensson, 2007, p. 1).
4 Recent theoretical models point at mixed effects. One 
could mention the ambiguous effects of inflation targeting on growth provided by Gupta 
(2006), the suboptimal nature of IT (dominated by nominal income growth) put forward 
                                                 
3 Albuquerque et al. (2005), for instance, construct a globalization measure that equals the share of 
explained variation in direct investment attributable to global factors. They show that the measure has 
increased steadily for developing and developed countries alike. See also Edison et al. (2004) for a detailed 
description of different measures of capital account openness. 
4 Bernanke (2003) also considers that the idea of IT focusing exclusively on control of inflation and 
ignoring output and employment objectives is a misconception. He suggests that “short-run stabilization of 
output and employment is more effective when inflation expectations are well anchored” through the 
constrained discretion that provides an IT regime.   4
by Kim and Henderson (2005), or the negative output and employment effects reported 
by Cordero (2007). 
At the empirical front, Svensson (2007, p. 3) states that “there is no evidence that 
inflation targeting has been detrimental to growth productivity, employment, or other 
measures of economic performance”, a view supported by Dotsey (2006) in his 
comparison of 5 industrial countries that have been targeting inflation for at least 10 years 
and 6 non-IT industrial countries. Similarly, Ball and Sheridan (2005) find no meaningful 
effect of IT on price stability, exchange rate volatility, long-run interest rates or output 
growth when they employ a cross section difference-in-difference model to explore the 
effects of IT in a sample of 20 OECD countries.  
Also, regarding the more fundamental empirical relation between inflation and 
economic growth, the existing body of evidence does not reach a consensus but does 
establish important differences between industrial and emerging economies. For instance, 
using data for 12 Latin American countries during the period 1950-1985, De Gregorio 
(1993) documents statistically significant and negative effects of average inflation on 
growth. Meanwhile, recent evidence by Pollin and Zhu (2005) for OECD countries shows 
that no clear pattern emerges at all between inflation and output growth. 
Although the general issue of collateral benefits having an impact on GDP has 
been conjectured by Kose et al. (2006), we are not aware of empirical work focusing on 
any benefits of monetary policy jointly with advances in the globalization of financial 
flows. The availability of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data and of recent 
theoretical constructions by Kose et al. (2006) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2007) make 
the proposed research route worth exploring. In this paper we examine the effects of IT   5
on income per capita growth using separate samples of industrial and emerging 
economies that have been facing increasing trade and financial integration. We do this by 
integrating the globalization wave to the potential output benefits of IT practices. In 
addition, accounting for globalization in our analysis is important because the more 
conducive environment for economic growth associated with an increase in the trade or 
financial flows across the world may be reduced if the inflation commitment is too strong 
in the case of IT followers. Under this scenario, we would have very high output costs of 
inflation. On the other hand, a very stable inflation environment is thought to be good for 
economic growth since firms may plan their investment decisions more carefully. The net 
impact is, however, an empirical issue. 
The results obtained in this paper provide additional support to earlier findings in 
the literature of a positive relationship between financial globalization and real output 
growth for both industrial and emerging economies. In addition, when exploring the 
adoption of inflation targeting (IT) regimes, we find (i) that soft-IT regimes have been 
marginally beneficial for industrial economies and also (ii) conclusive evidence of 
positive effects of fully-fledged IT regimes on income per capita across both emerging 
and industrial economies. One interpretation of our results is that the disinflation process 
of the last two decades has made the output benefits far outweigh the output costs of 
setting high interest rates in order to control inflation and attract capital flows in a global 
world. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main 
sources of our data, the industrial and emerging countries in each sample, the year in 
which they adopted IT and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the   6
theoretical foundations of our empirical model. Section 4 explains the econometric 
techniques employed and presents the results of our estimations under random effects and 
dynamic panel data methods. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and implications of 
this study. 
 
2. The Data 
The main sources of our data are the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
database and the multi-country dataset on foreign assets compiled by Milesi-Ferreti and 
Lane (2007). Data for GDP per capita (our dependent variable), investment and trade are 
obtained from the former source. Financial globalization indexes were constructed based 
on Milesi-Ferreti and Lane database. Our dataset initially spans from 1970 to 2004. We 
decide, however, to shorten the sample and concentrate on the period from 1986 to 2004 
following the suggestion by Kose et al. (2006) and Kose et al. (2008) that the recent wave 
of financial globalization started in the mid-1980s.  
Rather than assessing together industrial and emerging markets (EMEs), we 
compare the performance of both groups separately. In our view, comparing the 
performance of emerging economies with that of industrial economies might not be 
prudent. Firstly, developing economies and industrial economies started to experiment 
with IT at different times. Except for Chile and Israel, most EMEs started to target 
inflation in the second half of the 1990s, while almost every targeter industrial economy 
adopted the regime in the early 1990s. Secondly, because there might be long lags until 
the full effects of greater credibility---associated with the adoption of IT---are fully felt in 
the real economy, it is possible that comparing emerging vis-à-vis industrial economies   7
might be biasing the aforementioned assessments. Thirdly, there are fundamental 
institutional differences between industrial and emerging economies, such as less 
developed financial markets, weak fiscal institutions, lower credibility of financial 
institutions, liability dollarization, and vulnerability to sudden stops of capital inflows, 
which make it more difficult to design and implement effective monetary policies in 
EMEs (Mishkin, 2003). Due to these factors, shocks to EMEs are more persistent and 
recurrent than in industrial economies. As a result, comparing the performance of EMEs 
and industrial countries together might well be disadvantageous for the former group and 
make the effect of adopting an IT regime imperceptible.
5  
In order to check the impact of IT on real per capita output growth of industrial 
and emerging countries, we need to be as precise as possible regarding the 
implementation of the regime. Vega and Winkelried (2005) examined several studies that 
dated IT policies across countries and concluded that the year of IT adoption for 
developed economies is much less controversial than in developing countries. Following 
the study by Vega and Winkelried (2005), who found that IT has helped in reducing the 
level and volatility of inflation in the countries that adopted it, we define two dummy 
variables: ITsoft when there is a simple announcement of a numerical target or a non-
binding statement that a country is switching to IT, and ITfull for fully fledged IT 
adoption in which there exists a public target and a commitment to it as a unique nominal 
                                                 
5 Henry (2007) actually claims that one of the reasons why the literature on FG tends to find negligible 
impacts of financial liberalization on output growth is precisely because developing and industrial 
economies are grouped together in cross-sectional regressions.    8
anchor. In both cases, the dummy variables are 1 at the adoption date and thereafter; 0 
otherwise
6.  
[Table 1 here] 
We have a total of 55 economies in our sample, 22 are industrial and 33 emerging 
economies. From those, 23 have adopted IT, 13 are industrial economies and 10 
emerging markets. This implies that the incidence of IT is observed in little less than half 
of the countries in the sample. Table 1 list the economies in the sample, the years in 
which they adopted IT, their per capita income average growth rates, their average 
investment-to-output ratios and the average of their indexes of trade and financial 
globalization. Our first measure of globalization is the traditional trade openness (TO), 
which is calculated as total trade, the sum of exports and imports, over GDP. Following 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), we employ two alternative measures of financial 
globalization. First, a measure of international financial integration (IFI) with respect to 
GDP: IFIit = (FAit + FLit)/GDPit, where: FA (FL) denotes the stock of external assets 
(liabilities). Second, a financial integration measure also with respect to GDP and based 
on portfolio equity and FDI stocks: GEQit = (PEQAit + FDIAit + PEQLit +FDILit)/GDPit, 
where: PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock of portfolio equity assets and FDIA (FDIL) 
denotes the stock of their direct investment assets (liabilities).  
In Table 1 the countries with the largest rates of per capita growth across 
emerging and industrial countries are, respectively, China (8.41%) and Ireland (5.47%). 
Meanwhile, those with the lowest growth rates are Venezuela (0.005%) and Switzerland 
(0.89%). On average, the group of emerging markets presents slightly higher investment-
                                                 
6 Previous literature assessing the effects of IT on price stability has also made use this alternative 
classification of partial and full IT. See, for instance, Corbo et al. (2002) and Roger and Stone (2005).    9
to-output ratio (21.36% versus 20.99%) and per capita GDP growth rate (2.50% versus 
2.23%) than the group of industrial economies. Interestingly, the investment-to-output 
ratios are positively related to the growth rate of the output per capita in emerging 
markets (correlation coefficient of 0.75) but not among industrial economies (correlation 
coefficient of -0.03%). We observe in the following regression analysis that this negative 
relation between GDP per capita and investment-to-output ratios in industrial economies 
does not hold when we take into account the time dimension of the series. 
The correlations between our three measures of globalization and the output per 
worker are always positive and on average larger for industrial economies. Figure 1 
illustrates this positive relation more explicitly, for both samples of emerging and 
industrial economies we plot average per capita GDP growth rates against each of our 
three measures of trade (TO) and financial globalization (IFI and GEQ). In all six 
scattergrams the fitted regressions confirm the positive association between average GDP 
growth rates and trade and financial globalization. In Table 1, trade openness is the only 
measure of globalization that shows a higher average index among emerging economies 
(0.73) than across industrial countries (0.66). Financial globalization measures display 
positive correlation coefficients with output per capita and observe in general a stronger 
link in industrial economies: 0.35 against 0.01 for assets related globalization (IFI); 0.39 
against 0.16 for equity related globalization (GEQ); and 0.41 against 0.25 for trade 
openness (TO). Indeed, the differences observed across our two measures of financial 
globalization confirm the importance of calculating the two alternative indexes. 
 
3. Methodology   10
The main aim of this paper is not to improve upon the theoretical literature on 
economic growth but rather to use it along with the existing empirical literature to 
evaluate the influence of IT on income per capita growth. The basic estimable model 
employed here builds on Mankiw et al. (1992)’s seminal empirical application of the 
traditional textbook Solow model and on Islam (1995)’s reconsideration under panel data 
methods. Defined in logs, the empirical equation resulting from their analysis can be 
easily defined here as: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1i + β2 Zit + εit                                  (1), 
 
where Yit is the income per capita in country i at time t, β0 is an intercept term, β1i 
represents a vector of country specific factors, Zit is a vector of explanatory variable, 
which include the rate of population growth and the investment-to-output ratio (It/Yt); 
and εit  is the stochastic error term. From the traditional Solow (1956) model, we expect 
the two control variables in vector Z to have a positive impact on output per capita (i.e. β2 
> 0). 
Kose et al. (2008) refer to the “globalization period” from 1986:3 to 2003:4 as the 
one in which there were dramatic increases in the volume of cross-border trade in both 
goods and assets. Presumably, these increasing flows of trade and capital have resulted 
on higher output growth
7. Based on their evidence, we run the empirical models for 
several sample periods but do focus below on the post-1986 years, which should be more 
conducive to the globalization and inflation targeting procedures occurring jointly. 
                                                 
7 See also Kose et al. (2006) for the “recent wave of financial globalization” as the one which got started in 
the mid-1980s.   11
Kose et al. (2006) argue that using the sum of gross capital inflows and outflows 
as a ratio to national GDP yields a nice symmetry with the widely-used measure of trade 
openness, which is the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP. However, such 
annual flows tend to be quite volatile and subject to measurement error. To mitigate these 
problems, one may use the comprehensive measures on financial globalization discussed 
in the preceding section, which capture financial openness in a global world, alongside 
the more traditional measure of trade openness proposed by Kose et al. (2006).  
Our augmented empirical estimation which accounts for globalization can be thus 
defined as: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1i + β2 Zit + β3 Git + εit                                  (2), 
 
where G is a vector containing any of our three measures of globalization: IFI, GEQ or 
TO. This empirical equation considers the influence that trade and financial globalization 
might have had on per capita output growth. We expect β3 > 0 on the basis of more 
circulation of trade or financial flows helping the productive sector. The link between (2) 
and (1) is, in fact, very strong. Recent theoretical models explore the relationship between 
an index of capital/output ratio and economic growth. Beaudry and Collard (2006), for 
example, show that during a period of globalization we should observe an increase in the 
social returns to capital accumulation: β3 should increase. 
Finally, we account for the effects of adopting an IT regime on output growth by 
adding a dummy variable. That is 
   12
Yit = β0 + β1i + β2 Zit + β3 Git + β4 ITit + εit                  (3), 
 
where IT is defined either as ITsoft or ITfull. As explained earlier, the former is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 when a country adopts an incomplete IT regime and 
the later is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a country starts a fully-
fledged IT regime; if no IT regime is observed by a country the dummy variable takes 
values of zero. We expect β4 > 0 (discipline effect of low inflation) or β4 < 0 (too high 
output costs of inflation). 
In addition to the static specifications presented above, we allow for a dynamic 
specification that contains lagged real GDP per capita as independent variable. For 
equation (3) the corresponding dynamic specification is defined as: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1 Yit-1 + β2 Zit + β3 Git + β4 ITit + εit                  (4), 
 
This dynamic specification allows for slower output adjustment and can be 
estimated using the dynamic panel methods developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 
first differentiation required by this method eliminates country specific effects and time-
invariant explanatory variables from equation (4). We define and estimate similar 
dynamic specifications for equations (1) and (2). The expected signs are as in the static 
model and a value of β1 close to 1 would indicate a high degree of persistence.
8 
 
                                                 
8 As emphasized by Baltagi et al. (2008), the presence of the lagged dependent variable makes the 
estimated beta coefficients represent short-run effects. The long-run effects can be obtained by dividing 
each of the betas by (1 - β1), where β1 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.    13
 4.  Results 
4.1. Static Models 
Since the countries considered in our analysis are only a small subsample of a 
greater population, we employ random effects in estimating the initial static 
specifications.
9 Tables 2 and 3 report estimates of equations (1)-(3) allowing for 
traditional income growth determinants, globalization controls and IT effects on income 
per capita for our samples of industrial and emerging market economies, respectively. 
Without controls for traditional growth determinants and globalization one may observe a 
distorted long-run relationship between output per capita and IT.  
We report in Table 2 the results of estimating the static model in equations (1)-(3) 
for the sample of industrial countries. Here our findings are as follows. First, adding IT 
and globalization to the traditional textbook Solow equation exploited by Mankiw et. al. 
(1992) and Islam (1995), greatly improves the fit of the model (the R
2 within increases 
from 0.127 to levels ranging from 0.584 to 0.853). Second, as in those studies by Mankiw 
et. al. (1992) and Islam (1995), there are positive and strongly significant coefficients for 
the rate of population growth and the investment-to-output ratio. Third, globalization 
helps economic growth in the long-run, with trade openness leading to higher output 
growth than financial globalization. An increase of 10% in the financial globalization 
index leads to about 2.6% increase in real per capita income for the more general IFI 
measure and to around 1.6% for GEQ. Meanwhile, we observe that per capita income 
increases between 6.6% and 7.5% when globalization is assumed to increase by 10% 
                                                 
9 For emerging and industrial economies, Hausman tests were inconclusive in more than half of the 
estimations presented; whenever conclusive, the tests suggested that random effects were the correct 
specification. In addition, we estimated the models in (1)-(3) by fixed effects finding no qualitative 
difference in the significance of our estimates.   14
through an expansion of trade. Fourth, when the inflation targeting dummies are 
introduced, there are fairly positive values associated with the adoption of IT practices. 
Here, the coefficients vary in size according to the measure employed in the regression to 
control for globalization and depending on whether IT policies are partially adopted 
(ITsoft) or fully adopted (ITfull). Trade openness related estimations render the highest 
IT coefficients and, overall, ITfull noticeably presents larger and more significant 
coefficients than ITsoft. The latter finding suggests that adopting a full-fledged IT regime 
results in higher per capita income gains than adopting IT policies only partially. 
[Table 2 here] 
We report in Table 3 the results of estimating the static model for the sample of 
EMEs described previously. Most of the results are qualitatively similar to those we 
described above for industrial economies with one important difference. First, as before, 
controlling for globalization and IT improves the significance of the model considerably 
but not as much as in the estimates of industrial economies. The R
2 within increases from 
0.110 in equation (1) to levels between 0.348 and 0.462 in equations (2) and (3). Second, 
the expected positive effects of the investment-to-output ratio remain and, with some 
variations, they are close in magnitude to those observed for industrial economies. In 
contrast with the findings for industrial economies, for emerging markets population 
growth estimates present in all cases negative and very significant coefficients. This 
result is consistent with emerging markets high population growth rates being larger than 
those of their aggregate output, a situation that ultimately affects income per capita 
growth. Third, we observe again positive and very significant effects of globalization on 
income per capita. While the highest coefficients remain those related to trade (varying   15
from 0.257 to 0.273), we observe that both, trade openness and financial globalization 
coefficients are in general smaller than those we obtained for industrial economies. This 
result suggests that industrial economies might have won more from globalization than 
emerging markets (at least) as measured by income per capita. Fourth, targeting inflation 
seems to be more relevant for emerging markets than for industrial economies. 
Coefficients for ITsoft and ITfull are generally larger than those for industrial economies. 
For the sample of emerging markets, we observe larger significance for both kinds of IT 
coefficients. This latter result suggests that emerging markets benefited more from IT 
than industrial economies as measured by the growth of their income per capita. 
Moreover, it also indicates that EMEs were able to benefit from adopting IT even when 
they decided not to implement all its principles completely. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.2. Dynamic Models  
One important way to handle specification problems in our model is to allow for 
dynamic effects. Under such specification lagged real output conveys important 
information for the true patterns of per capita long-run output. We thus employ a model 
that takes into account output persistence alongside traditional growth controls and 
financial globalization measures in order to observe the true effects of IT on income per 
capita.  
It is well known that the estimates of a dynamic model under OLS are biased 
because they contain lags of the dependent variable which are ultimately correlated with 
the error term. The Generalized Method of the Moments (GMM) estimator developed by   16
Arellano and Bond (1991) solves this problem. Their method first differentiates static 
models presented in equations (1) to (3), removing time invariant explanatory variables. 
As in equation (4), the method produces dynamic equations that incorporate the lagged 
(endogenous) dependent variable. The endogenous explanatory variables are 
instrumented with suitable lags of their own. We employ in this case all available real per 
capita income lags as instruments. GMM estimations are said to be consistent if there is 
no second order autocorrelation in the residuals and the instruments employed are valid. 
The most common test employed to verify the validity of instruments in this GMM setup 
is the Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Table 4 reports the estimation of equations (1)-(3) under a dynamic specification, 
similar to that in (4), for the sample of industrial economies. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggest employing one-step estimations for inference purposes as two-steps standard 
errors tend to be biased downward in small sample. In order to check the validity of the 
instruments, we report the Sargan test for the two-step estimations, which does not reject 
the null that the instruments are valid. However, the AB tests for the absence of second-
order serial correlation leads to rejecting the null of no second order serial correlation. 
We therefore report in parenthesis standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The estimates suggest a very good overall fit with significant IT 
effects which are consistently robust across growth controls and globalization measures. 
  Several results are worth describing in the dynamic specification for industrial 
economies. First of all, lagged output always shows a positive and strongly significant 
impact on current output with a fairly high degree of persistence, ranging from about 
82% to 86% depending on the specification. Second, the impact of the investment-to-  17
output ratio remains positive and highly significant, albeit smaller in magnitude, once we 
control for persistence. Third, the empirical results in Table 4 also suggest that, once we 
control for output persistence effects, the financial globalization measures continue to 
have a positive effect on real output. The magnitude, however, is much smaller than in 
Table 2, ranging from 0.026 to 0.032 for IFI, from 0.016 to 0.019 for GEQ and 0.074 to 
0.084 for TO; again, this latter indicator consistently shows the larger impact across our 
alternative specifications. Globalization coefficients are always statistically significant at 
the conventional 1% level. Fourth, IT continues to have small but positive effects on 
income per capita. Interestingly, and in contrast to the static model, once we account for 
dynamics, the soft IT regime shows positive and significant coefficients at the 10% level. 
This result suggests that IT might be beneficial for industrial economies even if its 
practices are not fully adopted. Similarly, ITfull remains positive and significant but with 
slightly smaller impact than under the static specification. 
  In order to search for long-run effects as discussed in footnote #8, we divide each 
of the betas by (1 - β1), where β1 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. This 
implies that the long-run ITsoft coefficients in Table 4 are, respectively, 0.068, 0.088, 
and 0.067 across columns (5) to (7). Similarly, the long-run ITfull coefficients in Table 4 
are, respectively, 0.088, 0.113, and 0.081 across columns (8) to (10). Under the same set 
of controls, the static models imply that the implementation of a full-fledged IT regime 
by industrial countries helps marginally the output effects. Under dynamic models, 
however, the estimated long-run impact is higher by a substantial margin than the results 
reported in Table 2 for the static models. 
[Table 4 here]   18
Table 5 reports the results obtained from estimating equations (1)-(3) once we 
allow for dynamics in our sample of emerging market economies. The first point to 
notice in this Table is that, for all the estimates presented in columns (1) to (10), this time 
the AB serial correlation tests do not reject the null of no second order serial correlation. 
In addition, the Sargan tests for the two-step estimations do not reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments employed are valid. Second, while highly significant, the impact of 
lagged income per capita is notably smaller than the one observed across industrial 
economies. A possible explanation for this is that expectations about output performance 
are stronger in stable industrial economies than in more volatile emerging markets. Third, 
with respect to traditional growth controls, as expected, investment-to-output ratios are 
highly significant and present the positive expected signs. The results for population 
coefficients are, however, mixed; with statistically significant and positive impact only in 
3 of our 10 reported specifications and at the 10% level only. Fourth, financial 
globalization coefficients are positive and significant under all the specifications (i.e. not 
controlling for IT, controlling for ITsfot or ITfull) but the coefficients for trade openness 
are always negative and insignificant. This result clearly contrasts with those previously 
found for the static specification and the dynamic specification for industrial economies. 
Finally, with respect to the influence of IT, we observe no significant effect of ITsoft on 
output per capita once we control for dynamics. However, strict IT, as measures by 
ITfull, renders the positive expected sign and is statistically significant regardless of the 
globalization controls we employ in the estimations (IFI, GEQ or TO).  
[Table 5 here]   19
  We conduct the same exercise as before in order to obtain the long-run effects in 
the dynamic models of Table 5 for emerging markets. The long-run ITsoft coefficients in 
Table 5 are not statistically significant across columns (5) to (7). On the other hand, the 
long-run ITfull coefficients in Table 5 are, respectively, 0.027, 0.036, and 0.041 across 
columns (8) to (10), which are lower than the values reported for the static models in 
Table 3. We do confirm, however, that adoption of a full-fledged IT regime by emerging 
markets helps marginally the output effects as well. Contrary to the industrial economies 
case, the estimated long-run impact in emerging markets is lower than the results reported 
in Table 3 for the static models. This is because the persistence coefficient of output is 
considerably lower in emerging markets economies than in industrial countries: β1 is 
greater than 0.8 in Table 4 and β1 is lower than 0.4 for most of the estimations in Table 5. 
While β1 close to 1 would indicate near unit root behavior, a coefficient smaller than 0.5 
would suggest that output dynamics is more predictable, which is certainly not the case in 
emerging markets. One alternative interpretation is that the discipline effect of the 
disinflation process of the last two decades in emerging markets (and industrial countries) 
has made the output benefits far outweigh the output costs of promoting high interest 
rates to reduce inflation and attract capital flows in a global world.
10 However, due to the 
potential existence of long lags until the effects of greater credibility are fully observed in 
the real economy and the fact that emerging markets adopted IT regimes latter than 
industrial economies, the total effects of IT might have not been yet fully observed across 
emerging markets. This was precisely one of the arguments we posed to avoid assessing 
together industrial and emerging economies. 
                                                 
10 This second channel is present in the interest rate defense put forward by Flood and Rose (2002), while 
the first is simply the result of conducting a more stringent monetary policy with the aim of achieving a 
particular target for inflation.   20
In order to verify the robustness of our dynamic estimates, two important 
modifications were performed for both industrial and emerging economies. The first and 
most relevant was to investigate the possibility that globalization is endogenous. Under 
this scenario, economic growth leads to a higher level of financial flows across countries, 
which would invalidate the earlier assumption of globalization exogenous. Allowing for 
the endogeneity of globalization reports similar findings to those observed in Tables 4 
and 5 for industrial and emerging economies. We conclude that this modification does 
not improve the fit of the model. Another possibility is to consider a longer degree of 
memory on our dynamic specification. Allowing for more than one lag of output in the 
dynamic specification, we do not find subsequent lags coefficients significant in our 
estimates. We omit these results for space constraints, as well as those for endogenous 
globalization but they are available from the authors upon request.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined in this paper the relationship between IT and real per capita 
income in two samples comprising 22 industrial and 33 emerging markets focusing on 
the post-1986 period. To the extent that economies have also benefited from globalization 
over the last couple of decades, we have also placed particular attention to the effects that 
trade openness and capital flows have brought to economic growth alongside explicit 
inflation targeting (IT).
11 Overall, we found significant and positive effects of trade and 
financial globalization and IT on income growth. Once we control for traditional growth 
                                                 
11 Rogoff (2004) lists a number of ways in which globalization has helped to reduce long run inflation. 
Among the most important channels listed, he suggest that  greater competition has weakened the power of 
domestic monopolies and trade unions, leading to a permanent steeping up of the output-inflation trade-off 
faced by central banks. In our view, this makes examining the role of IT on output even more relevant.    21
determinants and the recent globalization trends, the adoption of a fully-fledged IT 
regime results in higher output income per capita for industrial and emerging economies. 
However, under dynamic models the estimated long-run output impact of inflation 
targeting in emerging markets is lower than the results reported for the static models. 
This is because the persistence coefficient of output is considerably lower (β1 is lower 
than 0.4) in emerging markets economies than in industrial countries (β1 is greater than 
0.8).  While the evidence suggests that industrial economies gained more from 
globalization, emerging markets seem to have benefited from adopting inflation targets as 
well. One likely interpretation is that the disinflation process of the last two decades in 
emerging markets has made the output benefits far outweigh the output costs by setting 
high interest rates to attract capital flows in a global world but that the full effect of 
adopting the regime have not been fully felt by emerging markets as in industrial 
economies. We argue that this might be due to the long lags until the full effects of 
greater credibility are felt in the real economy and the fact that emerging markets adopted 
the regime much later than industrial economies. 
Firm-level data in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006), for example, examine the 
effects of globalization on the debt structure of firms operating in seven emerging 
economies. They find that with financial liberalization long-term debt decreases and the 
maturity structure shifts to the short-term. This sort of collateral benefit contrasts with the 
one in this paper and occurs at the microeconomic level. Another extension is to revisit 
the links between trade and financial openness in the empirical models. Aizenman (2008) 
proposes a mechanism through public finance in which trade opening leads to financial 
opening. These extensions, however, are left for further research.   22
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 Figure 1: Per-capita GDP Growth and Globalization 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Country N ITsoft ITfull (Y/L) I/Y IFI GEQ TO Country NI T s o f t ITfull (Y/L) I/Y IFI GEQ TO
Argentina 19 1.04      17.13    1.13 0.26 0.22 Australia 19 1994 1994 2.05      24.33    1.40 0.70 0.37
Bangladesh 19 2.55      18.07    0.48 0.03 0.26 Austria 19 1.97      22.12    2.02 0.31 0.78
Brazil 19 1999 1999 1.07      18.60    0.71 0.25 0.19 Belgium 19 2.07      19.94    4.95 1.38 1.43
Bulgaria 14 1.91      15.79    1.71 0.15 1.03 Canada 19 1991 1994 1.70      19.69    1.69 0.82 0.66
Chile 19 1991 1999 4.40      22.40    1.50 0.60 0.61 Denmark 19 1.56      19.49    2.36 0.64 0.74
China 19 8.41      32.58    0.60 0.21 0.42 Finland 19 1993 1993 2.03      20.87    2.00 0.78 0.61
Colombia 19 1995 1999 1.47      18.24    0.79 0.17 0.36 France 19 1.74      19.31    2.23 0.85 0.47
Costa Rica 19 2.25      19.11    1.03 0.27 0.82 Germany 19 2.19      20.69    1.75 0.46 0.57
Czech Republic 11 1998 1998 3.26      28.49    1.26 0.38 1.17 Greece 19 1.97      19.92    1.17 0.18 0.45
Dominican Republic 19 2.82      20.26    0.78 0.24 0.75 Iceland 19 2001 2001 2.04      20.16    1.24 0.22 0.70
Ecuador 19 0.97      20.00    1.21 0.24 0.55 Ireland 19 5.47      19.24    7.21 2.54 1.39
Egypt 19 2.45      21.27    1.02 0.23 0.48 Italy 19 1.74      20.19    1.32 0.33 0.44
El Salvador 14 3.34      16.53    0.85 0.16 0.60 Japan 19 1.69      27.56    1.02 0.18 0.19
Hungary 19 2001 2001 2.11      21.89    1.14 0.32 0.97 Netherlands 19 2.32      21.40    4.10 1.74 1.13
India 19 3.39      22.85    0.39 0.06 0.22 New Zealand 19 1990 1991 1.99      20.66    1.72 0.76 0.58
Indonesia 19 3.16      24.83    1.03 0.11 0.57 Norway 19 2001 2001 2.28      21.34    1.65 0.50 0.71
Israel 19 1992 1997 1.53      20.55    1.39 0.33 0.77 Portugal 19 4.28      25.00    1.94 0.40 0.64
Korea 19 1998 1998 5.90      32.92    0.65 0.15 0.66 Spain 19 1994 1995 2.87      21.12    1.43 0.51 0.46
Malaysia 19 3.91      30.62    1.69 0.71 1.75 Sweden 19 1993 1995 1.96      18.12    2.59 1.22 0.71
Mexico 19 1995 1999 1.08      19.09    0.82 0.24 0.49 Switzerland 19 1993 1995 0.89      24.13    6.22 2.23 0.75
Morocco 19 1.85      22.19    1.23 0.19 0.52 United Kingdom 19 1992 1992 2.37      17.76    4.74 1.21 0.53
Nigeria 18 1.04      8.64      1.77 0.52 0.61 United States 19 1.96      18.75    1.19 0.56 0.22
Pakistan 19 1.90      16.65    0.67 0.08 0.34
Panama 19 1.54      17.10    4.69 0.50 1.52 Total/Average 418 2.23 20.99 2.54 0.84 0.66
Peru 19 1994 2002 0.75      19.48    1.04 0.22 0.31 Corr (Y/L, X) -0.03 0.35 0.29 0.41
Philippines 19 1995 2002 1.48      20.14    1.19 0.20 0.82
Poland 19 1998 1998 3.01      20.12    0.83 0.12 0.51
Singapore 19 4.39      32.53    5.74 2.45 3.54
South Africa 19 2000 2000 0.22      16.71    0.88 0.55 0.49
Thailand 19 2000 2000 5.09      31.39    1.07 0.28 0.92
Tu nisia 19 2.57      24.34    1.38 0.61 0.89
Turkey 17 2.15      22.63    0.74 0.07 0.46
Uruguay 19 2.10      12.84    1.52 0.12 0.42
Venezuela 19 0.00 -     20.19    1.33 0.27 0.50
Total/Average 624 2.50      21.36    1.30      0.33      0.73     
Corr(Y/L, X) 0.75      0.01      0.16      0.25     
Emerging Market Economies Industrial Countries
 
Notes: For the correlation estimates X represents the explanatory variables listed on each column: (I/Y), IFI, GEQ and TO. Bulgaria’s GDP is only available since 1991. The Czech Republic, 
El Salvador and Nigeria also present some missing data.   28
Table 2: Random Effects Model of GDP Per Capita: Post-1986 Years for Industrial Economies 
Yit = β0 + β1i + β2 Git + β3 ITit + β4 Zit + εit ,  G = IFI,  GEQ,  TO 
                                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                                
ln(I/Y)  -0.017  0.229***  0.245***  0.210***  0.238***  0.264***  0.285***  0.245***  0.268***  0.271*** 
   (0.060)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.043)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.045) 
ΔL/L  19.068***  5.247***  9.923***  14.699***  5.366***  10.071***  14.917***  5.546***  10.217***  15.141*** 
   (2.560)  (1.128)  (1.246)  (1.789)  (1.137)  (1.244)  (1.751)  (1.139)  (1.243)  (1.756) 
ln(IFI)     0.266***        0.263***        0.260***       
      (0.006)        (0.007)        (0.007)       
ln(GEQ)        0.162***        0.158***        0.156***    
         (0.004)        (0.005)        (0.005)    
ln(TO)           0.751***        0.672***        0.664*** 
            (0.037)        (0.041)        (0.042) 
ITsoft              0.009  0.019  0.074***          
               (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.018)          
ITfull                       0.018*  0.026**  0.071*** 
                        (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
cons  12.276***  11.437***  11.644***  12.010***  11.407***  11.578***  11.721***  11.386***  11.562***  11.761*** 
   (0.452)  (0.342)  (0.328)  (0.433)  (0.347)  (0.338)  (0.440)  (0.346)  (0.337)  (0.437) 
                                
R
2 within  0.127  0.852  0.813  0.584  0.852  0.814  0.602  0.853  0.816  0.601 
                                
Notes: Logarithms are taken on output, globalization measures, and investment/output series. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The β0 and β1i’s terms are included but are not 
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Table 3: Random Effects Model of GDP Per Capita: Post-1986 Years for Emerging Economies 
Yit = β0 + β1i + β2 FGit + β3 ITit + β4 Zit +εit                               
                                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                                
ln(I/Y)  0.075  0.282***  0.174***  0.187***  0.276***  0.177***  0.196***  0.297***  0.186***  0.215*** 
   (0.056)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
ΔL/L  -22.468***  -14.057***  -6.908***  -14.043***  -13.100***  -7.083***  -13.436***  -12.369***  -6.594***  -12.255*** 
   (2.623)  (1.677)  (1.661)  (1.696)  (1.647)  (1.667)  (1.670)  (1.688)  (1.669)  (1.705) 
ln(IFI)     0.240***        0.203***        0.209***       
      (0.023)        (0.023)        (0.023)       
ln(GEQ)        0.141***        0.134***        0.134***    
         (0.009)        (0.010)        (0.010)    
ln(TO)           0.315***        0.257***        0.273*** 
            (0.031)        (0.032)        (0.032) 
ITsoft              0.112***  0.031
b  0.105***          
               (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)          
ITfull                       0.105***  0.043**  0.109*** 
                        (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
cons  10.716***  9.956***  10.417***  10.427***  9.942***  10.392***  10.341***  9.874***  10.358***  10.277*** 
   (0.475)  (0.461)  (0.458)  (0.460)  (0.441)  (0.438)  (0.440)  (0.439)  (0.435)  (0.438) 
                                
R
2 within  0.110  0.348  0.462  0.340  0.382  0.464  0.368  0.372  0.466  0.367 
                                
Notes: Logarithms are taken on output, financial globalization, and investment/output series. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The β0 and β1i’s terms are included but are not 
reported. Hausman tests support the random effects model as explained in the text. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; ; 
b 
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Table 4: Dynamic Model (Arellano-Bond) of GDP Per Capita: Post-1986 for Industrial Economies 
Yit = β0 + β1 Yit-1 + β2 Zit + β3 Git + β4 ITit + εit ,  G = IFI,  GEQ,  TO 
                                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
ln(Yt-1)  0.869***  0.817***  0.849***  0.848***  0.824***  0.852***  0.851***  0.829***  0.858***  0.852*** 
   (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.043)  (0.037) 
ln(I/Y)  0.064***  0.076***  0.069***  0.076***  0.086***  0.082***  0.085***  0.084***  0.082***  0.083*** 
   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
ΔL/L  0.166  -0.100  0.045  0.305  -0.011  0.117  0.344  0.057  0.146  0.374 
   (0.804)  (0.654)  (0.734)  (0.605)  (0.651)  (0.720)  (0.618)  (0.617)  (0.673)  (0.612) 
ln(IFI)     0.032***        0.028***        0.026***       
      (0.008)        (0.007)        (0.007)       
ln(GEQ)        0.019***        0.017***        0.016***    
         (0.003)        (0.003)        (0.003)    
ln(TO)           0.084***        0.077***        0.074*** 
            (0.017)        (0.016)        (0.017) 
ITsoft              0.012**  0.013***  0.010**          
               (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)          
ITfull                       0.015***  0.016***  0.012*** 
                        (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
cons  0.003***  0.002**  0.001  0.002***  0.002**  0.001  0.002**  0.002**  0.001  0.002** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                                
Sargan Test  20.97  20.01  20.27  20.97  20.03  19.91  19.75  20.16  19.54  19.86 
   [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1] 
AB (1)  -2.23  -2.22  -2.38  -2.1  -2.24  -2.39  -2.13  -2.26  -2.4  -2.14 
   (0.056)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.033) 
AB (2)  -2.54  -2.12  -2.06  -2.21  -2.11  -2.05  -2.19  -2.23  -2.17  -2.27 
   (0.011)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.023) 
                                
Notes: Logarithms are taken on output, globalization, and investment/output series. The Table reports the first-step estimators of the Arellano and Bond (1992) procedure. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis below the coefficients for each explanatory variable. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  The Sargan test reports that under the null 
the overidentified restrictions are valid. AB (1) and AB (2) correspond to the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, under the null of no autocorrelation (p-values are reported in parenthesis below the AB 
statistics). 
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Table 5: Dynamic Model (Arellano-Bond) of GDP Per Capita: Post-1986 for Emerging Economies 
Yit = β0 + β1 Yit-1 + β2 Git + β3 ITit + β4 Zit + εit ,  G = IFI,  GEQ,  TO 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
ln(Yt-1)  0.615***  0.363***  0.381***  0.386***  0.363***  0.381***  0.386***  0.363***  0.382***  0.385*** 
   (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
ln(I/Y)  0.0905***  0.176***  0.142***  0.144***  0.176***  0.142***  0.144***  0.180***  0.148***  0.149*** 
   (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
ΔL/L  -0.453  1.285*  0.184  0.012  1.273*  0.222  -0.009  1.367*  0.27927  0.163 
   (1.738)  (0.724)  (0.706)  (0.696)  (0.731)  (0.715)  (0.702)  (0.727)  (0.709)  (0.700) 
ln(IFI)     0.106***        0.106***        0.105***       
      (0.010)        (0.010)        (0.010)       
ln(GEQ)        0.017***        0.017***        0.015**    
         (0.006)        (0.006)        (0.006)    
ln(TO)           -0.008        -0.008        -0.006 
            (0.014)        (0.014)        (0.014) 
ITsoft              0.001  -0.003  0.002          
               (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)          
ITfull                       0.017*  0.022**  0.025*** 
                        (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
cons  0.009***  0.013***  0.013***  0.014***  0.013***  0.013***  0.014***  0.012***  0.012***  0.014*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                                
Sargan Test  31.75  31.48  32.83  31.99  31.13  31.09  31.98  31.56  31.32  31.13 
   [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1]  [1] 
AB (1)  -0.981  -2.39  -1.79  -1.61  -2.39  -1.79  -1.61  -2.44  -1.85  -1.7 
   (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.073)  (0.107)  (0.017)  (0.073)  (0.107)  (0.015)  (0.064)  (0.089) 
AB (2)  -0.08  -0.47  -0.09  -0.15  -0.47  -0.09  -0.15  -0.43  -0.081  -0.13 
   (0.940)  (0.639)  (0.928)  (0.881)  (0.641)  (0.928)  (0.882)  (0.666)  (0.940)  (0.899) 
Notes: Logarithms are taken on output, globalization, and investment/output series. The Table reports the first-step estimators of the Arellano and Bond (1992) procedure. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis below the coefficients for each explanatory variable. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  The Sargan test reports that under the null 
the overidentified restrictions are valid. AB (1) and AB (2) correspond to the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, under the null of no autocorrelation (p-values are reported in parenthesis below the 
AB statistics). 